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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the institutionalisation of inequality in relations between donors and NGOs 
in the international development sector.  We argue that these relations operate within a 
neoliberal and competitive marketplace, which are necessarily unequal.  Specifically, we focus on 
the apparently mundane practice of impact assessment (IA), and consider how this is 
fundamental to understanding the performative enactment of institutional inequality. For our 
analysis we draw upon Miller and Rose’s work on governmentality and calculative practices.  We 
develop our argument with reference to a case study of a donor driven IA initiative being 
conducted in India. Specifically, we consider an IA initiative that the donor has piloted with one 
of the NGOs they fund that seeks to improve the livelihoods of Indian farmers.  We will argue 
that institutional inequality can be understood in the way the market as a social institution 
becomes enacted into mundane calculative practices. Calculative practices produce different 
kinds of knowledge and in so doing becomes a way in which subjects position themselves, or 
become positioned, as unequal. 
Keywords: international development, impact, inequality, calculative practice, governmentality 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Within the international development sector, governments and other donor organisations 
increasingly require nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) to account for their impact. Impact 
assessment (IA), the focus of this paper, typically seeks to identify and evaluate a development 
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project at specific milestones achieved against the project aims. For donors, IA informs decisions 
about whether to continue to fund specific projects and how to prioritise their future 
development activities. Some scholars have noted that management knowledge such as IA has 
become increasingly widespread across the sector (Banks & Hulme, David, 2012; Rankin, 2001).  
Critics have argued that such managerial knowledge is donor centric and has led to asymmetries 
in power between donors, NGOs and beneficiaries (Hayes and Westrup, 2012).  However, this 
literature has thus far failed examine critically how IA is implicated in institutionalising inequality 
between donors and NGOs.  This is the focus of our paper.  
While not directly about IA, Dar’s (2014) study of written NGO reports highlighted that top-down 
reporting leads to disempowerment amongst NGO workers.  She argues that as the reports are 
required to be written in English, this privileges English speaking donors and NGO staff (in her 
case the aspirational Indian Middle class). Scholars have also noted that western knowledge such 
as reports are viewed as superior to non-western knowledge such as stories (Dar, 2014). Further,  
others have argued that western management techniques are imposed on the global south 
which precludes input from southern actors (Contu and Girei (2013)(Dar, 2008).  This leads to 
decisions about funding projects being based on assumptions that are disconnected from local 
settings (Riddell (2008)(Hayes & Westrup, 2012).  It also leads to NGO workers mimicking 
western forms of accountability (Dar, 2014; Hayes & Westrup, 2012).  Critics have argued that 
much work is expended by NGOs professionalizing’ and meeting donor requirements, and in 
producing the evidence of their impact, leaving them with less time to work with beneficiaries 
(Strathern, 2003).  Evidencing impact also diverts the budget away from beneficiaries towards in-
house or external experts (Roberts, Jones III, & Fröhling, 2005). Further, as Dar (2014) 
highlighted, project reporting is often overstated by NGOs in order to attract funding from the 
same or future donors. This literature seems to suggest that western managerial knowledge, 
especially produced through quantitative metrics, can disempower NGOs in significant ways.   
Impact assessment can of course be seen within the wider landscape of attempts to manage 
organizational practices by transforming them into calculations that can render them 
comparable, in some way. Central to this approach of managing—or, this ‘governing technology’, 
one might say—is the neoliberal notion that resources are allocated optimally in more or less 
competitive markets. A commonly used technology to create such competitive markets are 
ranking and league tables.  While the literature on rankings and international development is 
limited (Mühlen-Schulte, 2012), there has been a considerable discussion of rankings in other 
sectors such as education (Collins & Park, 2015; Hardy, Heimans, & Lingard, 2011; Morrissey, 
2013), government (Hansen & Mühlen-Schulte, 2012), and consulting (Pollock & D’Adderio, 
2012).  Overall, scholars highlight that while rankings appear to provide objective measures, that 
seem to facilitate comparability and competition, they are in fact profoundly political (Espeland & 
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Sauder, 2007; Espeland & Stevens, 2008). In relation to their research of University Law Schools, 
Sauder and Lancaster (2006, p.130) claim that rankings affect changes in morale, staff 
recruitment, and retention.  Rankings are also claimed to produce gaming strategies where 
institutions such as universities make decisions about their investment and admissions criteria so 
as to enhance their positions in their league tables (Clarke & Knights, 2015).  Espeland and 
Sauder (2007, p.11) describe rankings as reactivity mechanisms, which are “patterns that shape 
how people make sense of things… how attention is distributed, and the interactive scripts 
people adopt.” They further note that they not only “exhibit a constant ‘surveillance’ or presence 
in/over the higher education environment, but they have become a ‘self-disciplining’ force.” 
What Espeland and Sauder and others highlight is that rankings shape actors behaviors and 
understandings of what is valued, and as such have strong self-disciplining outcomes for those 
who become reflected in them (Bowman & Bastedo, 2009; Davis, Fisher, Kingsbury, & Merry, 
2012).  Further, not only have rankings become an industry themselves, they have spawned new 
roles within organizations, and new subsectors, that advise their clients on how to improve their 
position in the matrices that constitute the ranking algorithm (Pollock & D’Adderio, 2012). 
Overall, this literature has highlighted that rankings come to shape what people do, how they 
understand their role, and in doing so, normalise everyday activity.  This aligns closely with our 
argument, in relation to governmentality and inequality.  In our discussion below, we want to 
show how IA (in the development context) and rankings (more generally) function as calculative 
practices that play a very specific role in institutionalizing, not only the neoliberal logic, but also 
regimes of inequality.  To do this we will draw on the ideas of governmentality, which refers to 
the way certain actions may structure the field of possible actions available to others.   
In sum: the overall aim of this paper is to understand the institutionalisation of inequality in 
relations between institutions operating in the international development sector. Specifically, we 
are concerned with the ways in which IA methodologies configure the relations between 
different institutional actors and how this produces and reproduces institutional inequality across 
the international development sector.  To do this we explore two research questions: (1) what is 
the role of impact assessment in shaping institutional inequality between institutional actors in 
the development sector? (2) How are these asymmetrical relations enacted in everyday practice?  
To answer these questions, we will argue that we need to attend to the ways in which practices 
of inequality become enacted through, and emerge from, mundane organisational practices—
specifically, calculative practices.  Our empirical setting reports on a UK based philanthropic 
donor (Imagine) that funds an Indian NGO to work with rural farmers to improve their 
livelihoods.  Specifically, we will focus on a project to develop an impact assessment 
methodology to better identify and measure the impact of their funding.  We focus on the ways 
in which the mundane practices associated with the recording of impact by an Indian NGO 
modify, or configure, the field of possible actions available to all the actors involved.  In our 
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analysis, we will show how mundane attempts at governing action enact regimes of inequality. 
This becomes very significant as these regimes of inequality—that become more or less 
institutionalised as legitimate governing practices—become adopted as ‘good practice’ in the 
development sector. 
The next section reviews some of the relevant literature on inequality and institutions. We then 
outline our theoretical orientation, regarding governmentality. Section 4 outlines the case study 
and our methodological approach. Section 5 discusses the analytical themes specifically in 
relation to governmentality and calculative practices. Section 6 develops our analysis, specifically 
in relation to inequality.  The final section concludes by considering the relations between 
inequality, institutions and organizational practices. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY 
The literature in organization studies on inequality is extensive in areas such as corporations, 
disability, sexual-orientation, age, gender and markets (Barley, 2007;Belliveau, 2011; Huffman, 
Cohen, & Pearlman, 2010)—refer to (Acker, 2006, 2012) for a detailed review of this literature, 
which we will not engage directly here. However, we would want to consider, briefly, the 
question of inequality with respect to institutional theory, or one might say the 
institutionalisation of inequality.  
Institutional theory has not been entirely silent on the matter of inequality—although most of 
the significant contributions has not been in management and organization studies literature.  
There is a significant literature on institutional inequality that has focused on inequality in the 
form of institutional discrimination, especially in terms of gender and race. For example, in her 
paper on racial bias in medical treatment Bowser (2000, p.371) defines institutional racism as 
‘those self-perpetuating patterns and practices made in reliance on taken-for-granted 
background knowledge about race that serve to lower a particular racial group’s status.’  (Haney 
Lopez, 1999), in his study of grand juror selection by judges in California identifies two ways in 
which these self-perpetuating patterns operate: what he calls ‘scripts’ and ‘paths’.  He shows 
how judges unconsciously use the ‘pick your friend’ script to select their acquaintances as grand 
jurors. When challenged about their selections they tended to follow established ‘paths,’ which 
emphasizes background understandings and established grammars, to constrain their decisions. 
For example, in such situations they often invoke the established path of ‘selecting the best 
qualified jurors’ to constrain their selection practice such that they end up selecting their 
acquaintances, and excluding certain racial groups—and in so doing unintentionally enact and 
perpetuate what he calls racial institutions.   
(Albiston, 2009), in her study of gender inequality in the workplace, suggests that workplace 
institutions ‘incorporate historical social practices that presumed women would be marginal 
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workers and would occupy subordinate roles in both the workplace and family.’  She warns that 
researchers should not only consider the way in which certain work practices came to be taken 
for granted, but should also focus on how the meanings of those practices are deeply embedded 
in the social conditions that accompanied their historical development.  Thus, she suggests, that 
institutions are not primarily important because they encourage or limit the operation of 
unconscious prejudice, assumptions, bias, etc. Rather, they are important because they embody 
specific, historically determined, identity conceptions, as in the case of gender and race.  What we 
see, in her work, is a shift of focus away from the practices of institutional actors (their taken for 
granted assumptions, believes, biases, etc.) to certain historically determined conceptions (one 
might say generally shared and taken for granted knowledge) that tend to organize meaning, 
apriori, in significant ways.  She suggests that even the attempts to explicitly address gender 
inequality—such as all the employment practices to ‘accommodate’ pregnancy, for example—
end up reinforcing these historically determined identity conceptions, and as such, institutional 
inequality. (Martin, 2004) takes this a step further. She argues that these historically determined 
identity conceptions, such as gender, should be understood as social institutions. She argues that 
social institutions such as gender persist, shape, and get reenacted through mundane 
organizational practices – the example to ‘accommodate’ periods of pregnancy cited by 
(Albiston, 2009) being illustrative of this.  This focus on the importance of the social organization 
of meaning, expressed as social institutions, is in our view, helpful. The question then becomes 
how historically determined social institutions such as gender, race, etc. gets translated in and 
through mundane organizational practices—such as the ‘scripts’ and ‘paths’ that (Haney Lopez, 
1999) identified.  Before we proceed, however, let us pause to ask why the question of the 
institutionalization of inequality has not featured in any significant way in the management and 
organization studies literature?  And moreover, if it did become a focus, what would be an 
appropriate way to attend to it?  
One theme that runs through all accounts of inequality is the issue of more or less enduring 
systematic asymmetries of power and agency.  If this is the case, why did institutional theory not 
engage significantly with power, and in particular with systematic asymmetries of power? One 
answer to these questions is proposed by (Munir, 2015). He suggests that although institutional 
theorists are concerned with power, implicitly or explicitly, they are mostly not concerned with 
its problematic use. He suggests that the growing inequality inside and outside organizations are 
largely overlooked by institutional theorists, and proposes a more critical approach to account 
for the ‘problematic’ use of power.  Others might argue that the problem is that power has never 
been an explicit preoccupation for institutional theory (Clegg, 2010). Indeed, such criticism has 
also come from within the tradition itself (T. B. Lawrence, 2008; Munir, 2015).  Nonetheless, it 
can be suggested that power has always been implicitly and explicitly present in institutional 
theory, from the start.  In their paper on institutional isomorphism DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
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suggested that their work connects to the question of power in two senses: ‘[p]ower to set 
premises, to define the norms and standards which shape and channel behaviour [and the way] 
elites can define appropriate models of organizational structure and policy which then go 
unquestioned for years to come’ (p. 157).  It seems that it is this second sense of power—as 
more or less intentional and actor-centric—that seem to have become the focus of institutional 
theory, as reflected, for example, in DiMaggio’s (1988) later, and very influential, work on the 
institutional entrepreneur.   
This actor centric view of power—as reflected in the work on the  institutional entrepreneur—
leads to a type of ‘hypermuscular agency’ (Clegg, 2010) which obscures the mundane 
organisation practices that renders such an actor possible, or impossible, in the first place.  The 
research on institutional work, with its emphasis on ‘the myriad, day-to-day equivocal instances 
of agency,’ attempts remedy this tendency to focus on ‘heroic’ actors and events (Lawrence, 
Suddaby, & Leca, 2011), yet it still focuses on intentional work that is ‘aimed at affecting an 
institution or set of institutions’ (p. 53).  Others, such as Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) turns to 
practice theory to make visible the more emergent, spatially dispersed, and heterogeneous 
activity by actors that enact institutionalising practices.  Specifically, they suggest, in their 
conclusion, that what is needed is not only attend to actors, as such, but also ‘wider meaning 
systems and theories embedded in cultural elements such as categories, conventions, and 
discourse’.  This is exactly where our contribution will be focused, as we hope to demonstrate 
below.   
More recently, Lawrence (2008) has overtly taken on the criticism that institutional theory does 
not engage with power in his widely cited chapter Power, Institutions, and Organisations.  He 
argues that power is central to our understanding of how institutions operate. To facilitate such 
understanding he proposes a framework of three institutional dimensions of power: institutional 
control, institutional agency, and institutional resistance. Of particular significance for our 
purpose is the dimension of institutional control. In his discussion of these three dimensions, he 
explicitly adopts the Foucauldian view that power is relational rather than something that an 
actor can have, hold, or keep in reserve.  Hence, institutional control is understood as the 
relational effects of institutions on actors—his illustrative example is that of disciplinary power 
(citing Foucault’s work as central to this).  In the concluding part of his chapter, he suggests that 
‘the problem of institutional control is far more complex than current institutional theories can 
address, and that many of the important details of how institutional control occurs remain to be 
worked out’ (p.187).  We concur with this and suggest that our work attempts to do exactly that. 
More precisely, we would suggest that our empirical case illustrates that there is an intimate 
connection between the operation of institutional control, and the enactment institutional 
inequality.  This relationship, we will aim to show, can best be understood through the notion of 
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governmentality, as expressed in the later work of Foucault (1982) but also developed 
extensively by Miller and Rose (1990; 2008).   
3. GOVERNMENTALITY 
In our introduction, above, we highlighted an unfolding narrative of attempts to govern the 
development sector through the use of managerial knowledge, with specific emphasis on impact 
assessments.  In this section, we will outline a particular way to understand these attempts at 
governing, that is, as governmentality. Governmentality allows us to consider the 
institutionalisation of inequality in the terms suggested by Lounsbury and Crumley (2007, p. 
1007). That is, in terms of ‘wider systems of meaning’ (neoliberalism, in our case) and in terms of 
embedded ‘categories, conventions, and discourses’ (knowledge production through calculative 
practices, in our case).  In his 1982 essay The Subject and Power, under the heading ‘how power 
is exercised’ Foucault offers an alternative to the dominant actor-centric adversarial model of 
power/resistance.  He suggests that ‘the exercise of power is not simply a relationship between 
partners, individual or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others.’  He calls 
these actions that modify the field of possible actions available to others, government (or 
governmentality, as it has become defined).  This governmental relationship of power does not 
prohibit, or constrain, it enables, but in specific ways.  The actors, situated within this field of 
possible actions, choose freely to become enacted within the range of possibilities available to 
them. 
Governmentality can be understood through three dimensions, regimes of governance, 
technologies of governance and calculative practices and subjects (Figure 1). For analytical 
purposes, we will discuss each of these in turn. However, in their practical enactment they are 
intimately intermeshed and mutually constitutive.   
 
Figure 1:  Governmentality 
Unlike the traditional practices of management control, which assumes the power and authority 
to be located and mobilised intentionally, a regime of governance points to the ‘conducting of 
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conduct.’  That is, control that is not externally imposed but is the result of a multiplicity of more 
or less autonomous, but interdependent, actors or institutions shaping conduct through a taken 
for granted logic or rationality. According to Foucault, and others, the dominant taken for 
granted logic or rationality, in the West, has become neo-liberalism. This is neo-liberalism not 
only understood as a political economy but the extension of the market logic and values to all 
spheres of life so as to “reform institutional and individual conduct so they both come to embody 
the values and orientations of the market, expressed in notions of the enterprise and the 
consumer” (Dean, 2009, p. 201).  Dean and others propose that governance is enacted by actors 
seemingly freely taking upon themselves certain expectations and responsibilities by accepting 
the taken for granted governing logic (of the market) as natural and self-evident.  
How is this conduct of conduct enacted, specifically? This is done through technologies of 
governance. Rose and Miller (1992, p. 183) explain that technologies of governance aim to 
establish “a multitude of connections…between the aspirations of authorities and the activities of 
individuals and groups.”  More specifically, in order to achieve these connections aspirations and 
activities such technologies of governance need to enact domains of knowledge and subjects that 
orient themselves freely according to these ‘claims of truth’—that is regimes of truth and self-
governing subjects.  Miller and Rose in their work demonstrated how this is achieved through 
governing technology, which they refer to as calculative practices.  
Miller and Rose (as quoted in Miller (2008, p. 57) suggest that, “calculation… [is] one of the pre-
eminent modalities of making programmes [of governance] operable.”  Miller (2008, p. 58) in his 
studies of the calculative practices of accounting—such as double entry bookkeeping, corporate 
financial reporting and managerial accounting—show how “the single financial figure is a 
technology of intervention par excellence… [it] not only accords objectivity and neutrality, it 
makes comparable activities and processes that may otherwise have little in common.”  
Calculative practices enact domains of knowledge (with associated expertise) that constitute 
regimes of truth.  Such regimes of truth can then function to distinguish between ‘true’ and 
‘false’ statements about the activity being governed. For example, the question of whether a 
company is financially sound can be determined by reference to accounting and financial data. In 
such regimes of truth the ‘facts’ are inseparable from the techniques, mechanisms and rules that 
constitute them as such. 
Once established such calculative practices (with its associated regimes of truth) enact calculative 
subjects (also referred to as self-governing subjects).  As Miller and Rose (1990, p. 18) suggest, in 
the end “[g]overning operates through subjects.” Calculating subjects internalise the regime of 
truth and orient themselves accordingly—knowledge and expertise becomes translated into the 
personal capacities and aspirations of these subjects.  For example, managers, as calculating 
subjects, see themselves as responsible for the profitability of the organization and govern their 
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own practices accordingly.  Further, as Espeland and Sauder have argued, the pervasiveness of 
rankings in higher education has led to the incremental transformation of HEIs “into entities that 
conform more closely to the criteria used to construct rankings, and prompt[ing] the 
redistribution of resources, the redefinition of work, and gaming” (2007, p.33). More specifically, 
in relation to our first research question,  it suggests that IA expertise in the development sector, 
produced through calculative practices such as impact evaluation models, “makes 
intersubjectivity calculable” (Rose, 1998, p.91). In our case study, we will show how IA, as a 
technology of governance, enacts domains of knowledge and self-governing subjects.  In relation 
to our second research question, we will argue that these mundane calculative practices lead to 
relatively unpredictable ‘consequences, effects, and outcomes’. Further, we will argue that such 
outcomes are framed within a neo-liberal logic of competition and markets. 
The neo-liberal logic of the market has as its most basic mechanism competition, the cultivation 
of differential relational inequalities. These relational inequalities enact the market but also the 
enterprising subject. In these unequal or dissymmetrical relations actors are always in the 
position of simultaneously being enacted (through unequal relations of power) and exercising 
power (drawing inequalities to act). Differently stated inequality circulates. Tracing this 
circulation of dissymmetry or inequality, specifically, is our ethico-political task, as suggested by 
Foucault: “My point is not that [inequality] is bad, but that [it] is dangerous, which is not exactly 
the same as bad.  If [it] is dangerous, then we always have something to do.  So my position leads 
not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. I think that the ethico-political choice we 
have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 
231).  We will do this by tracing the circulation through the situated operation of mundane 
calculative practices—what Foucault calls the micro-physics of power—enacted in an attempt to 
govern international development activity in India. 
4. THE IMAGINE FOUNDATION 
In order to understand the role of IA in shaping inequality in relations between institutional 
actors in the development sector, we report on a case study of a UK based philanthropic donor 
(Imagine). Imagine is a grant-making organization that funds “efficient and impact-driven models 
of development” and actively engages with the NGOs they fund so as to assist them in achieving 
their goals and “measurable results”.  Imagine is owned by Vijay, a London based venture 
capitalist.  In conjunction with an Indian NGO (Rural India), Imagine funds activities with rural 
farmers. As part of their development of this programme, they initiated a project to develop an 
IA methodology to better identify and measure the impact that their funding has. This took the 
form of a survey that captured key performance metrics relating to 10,000 rural farmers. The 
survey included predominantly closed question fields (amounts, yes/no answers, and limited 
choice responses) that charted performance indicators such as family unit size, changes in 
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income, crop based agriculture and livestock farming, children’s education, and housing facilities.  
A spreadsheet was developed and tablets provided.  NGO field workers and local village 
volunteers used mobile tablet computers loaded with survey software to conduct surveys in 
villages and farmers’ houses. After conducting the surveys, field workers returned the devices 
back to NGO offices and uploaded the survey data onto an office computer for storage and later 
analysis by NGO staff.  In the past, data had been manually entered into the central computers.  
Research Methodology  
Our programme of empirical work was undertaken between April 2013 and March 2014.  
Imagine approached the authors seeking advice about developing their existing IA assessment 
processes. At the outset, Imagine requested that we be involved in reviewing their evaluation 
approach and providing suggestions for change. We agreed that initially we would familiarise 
ourselves with their past and current practices before we intervened directly. However, after 
eight months our key contact in Imagine moved onto another project and our communication 
with the NGO gradually petered out.  Without the direct access mediated by the donor, the NGO 
gradually stopped responding to our questions for further meetings and data.  While we do not 
know why exactly, it is reasonable to assume that this review was not something the NGO saw as 
immediately beneficial to them. Thus, while initiating the project as an action research project, in 
effect has been an interpretive case study (Walsham, 1995). 
In relation to our primary data collection, we undertook a total of ten telephone / Skype 
interviews over this eleven-month period.  Interviews were conducted with Vijay, the venture 
capitalist, Leonard, the project manager, Chandan (the NGO director) and several other NGO 
staff. Some of the interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis, while others were group 
calls between several participants.  All interviews were semi-structured and lasted typically 
between one and two hours.  Interview questions centred on the rationale for introducing the IA 
project, the problems they had encountered, the different roles, the collection of impact data, 
the spreadsheets and the qualitative impact data. Interviews were recorded and transcribed.  A 
number of follow-up interviews were undertaken so as to clarify issues or to ask further 
questions.  Our primary research was limited due to the difficulties already mentioned in relation 
to securing access.  We were granted access through the donor and as such we were conscious 
throughout that we were viewed by the NGO as being aligned with the interests of the donor.  
This may have shaped the nature of their responses, but also relations with the NGO once our 
key contact at the donor changed role.  Secondly, we sensed that the donor had not appreciated 
the time that our study would take. He had primarily invited us thinking we would be able to 
quickly redesign the spreadsheet questions and to also specify some changes to the tablet PC’s 
that were used to collect the impact data.  A further limitation related to the number of NGO 
staff that we were able to interview.  As, English was not spoken by many of the NGO staff, 
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volunteers and beneficiaries, interviews via Skype were not feasible.  Further, though we planned 
a research visit to India to meet a wide range of NGO staff and beneficiaries, this was curtailed by 
the NGOs gradual withdrawal from the research. 
In relation to secondary data, Imagine provided us with 2000 survey responses from the previous 
eight years.  They also provided us with the impact spreadsheets that this data was inputted into.  
We also collected project documentation, reports and brochures.  We discussed this secondary 
data during interviews with donor and NGO staff.  For example, we would ask about the 
categories chosen in the spreadsheet, any changes that had been made, their training 
programmes, the selection of locations, the organisation of staff and volunteers and the data 
collection process. 
We analysed our data manually.  At the end of each interview we listed themes that were 
emerging, then transcribed the interviews, and reconsidered the themes once more. Themes 
were also compared between interviews. Our particular focus was on understanding the ways in 
which IA shaped the relations between the donor and the NGO.  We gradually organized them 
into broader themes (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000)(Strauss, 1987). In terms of the secondary 
data, we looked for themes in the brochures and reports, and produced summary reports from 
the excel spreadsheet.  We then considered these themes more specifically with our theoretical 
commitments, governmentality, and with the literature.   
5. IMPACT ASSESMENT BY IMAGINE 
This section will discuss how IA was enacted with reference to regimes of governance, 
technologies of governance and calculative practices and calculative subjects.   
Impact and its regime of governance 
Government is a problematizing activity: it poses the obligations of rulers in terms of 
the problems they seek to address.  (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 181) 
A first analytical theme we seek to establish is how this practice of IA in the international 
development sector is aligned to a dominant regime of governance. Specifically, we want to 
understand what the problem is for which IA is supposed to be the governing technology.  The 
problematizing activity for neo-liberalism is how to shape institutional and individual conduct so 
they embody the values and orientations of the market. In this case the market for grant funding 
from donors.  To do this NGOs need to demonstrate their value propositions as impact. Thus, IA 
becomes positioned as a powerful governing technology—akin to the ‘return on investment’ 
methodology used in for-profit organizations.  It aims to transform the relationship between 
resources utilised, and outcomes achieved.  In other words, IA allows for the supposed outcomes 
of development activity to become comparable in a competitive grant or donor seeking market.   
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A neoliberal form of governmentality and its discourse of ‘return’ on resources invested were 
very evident in our case study.  From the donor’s perspective, IA was an important way for them 
to gain a clear and objective insight into the extent to which their funding was having any ‘return’ 
in terms of increasing the incomes of farmers in making them self-sufficient.  Indeed, in an 
interview Vijay, the donor, explained that he had been funding Rural India for ten years, 
providing millions of pounds but was unsure if it actually had a benefit.  He said he could not see 
why Rural India could not account for their impact just as all his for-profit businesses were 
routinely required to do. He was adamant that some of his existing approaches and technologies 
could be adapted and used to measure the impact they were having. What he did not articulate, 
and that which we want to focus on here, is what this particular governing rationality, with its 
associated technology does, what it enacts, and why it matters. 
Technologies of governance & calculative practices 
Governmentality allows us to shift from what IA is, to what it does, as a particular technology of 
governance, within a particular governing rationality. Rose and Miller (1992, p. 183) explain that 
technologies of governance aim to establish “a multitude of connections…between the 
aspirations of authorities and the activities of individuals and groups.”  How do the aspirations of 
Vijay become connected to the activities of the NGOs?   
Vijay appointed Leonard to lead the project from London, and to put in place an IA methodology 
in collaboration with Rural India.  Leonard is a senior, trusted, and long serving member of Vijay’s 
for-profit business and would frequently be deployed to initiate new projects.  The problem for 
Leonard was how to translate the activities and associated outcomes (of Rural India and the 
farmers) to become relevant to the decision making aspirations of Vijay. What Vijay required was 
a set of technologies that ‘grasp’ the truth of impact and ‘represent’ it in a form that allows for 
‘conscious political calculation’—within the already assumed neoliberal rationality (Rose & Miller, 
1992). In Vijay’s discourse this required a methodology that would render visible the impact of 
his investments—so that decisions can be made about the allocation of resources.  Such a 
methodology called for calculative practices.  Miller (2008, p. 179) suggests that calculative 
practices are the “mechanisms through which programs of government are articulated and made 
operable.”  In the case of Vijay it took the form of a spreadsheet (Figure 2), amongst others.  
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Figure 2: Impact assessment spreadsheet 
Spreadsheets allow for the juxtaposition of large amounts of numeric or nominal data that can 
then be brought into relation with each other. As such, Leonard focused on producing a 
spreadsheet that would form the core of the IA methodology (Figure 2).  Leonard specified many 
of the fields in the spreadsheet that the NGO was required to complete.  The spreadsheet 
renders development practices visible through specific numbers, such as a farmer’s income, 
housing, sanitation, family size, land size, and their livestock etc.  This data can be compared 
against the impact that was forecast, and the resources provided between farmers, regions and 
over time.  Further, as the donor supports other NGOs, it provides for comparison between one 
another.  Central to the success of the calculating practices was the perceived accuracy of the 
data. In order to capture the impact data accurately, in situ, Imagine also developed software, 
implemented on tablets, to capture the data. The software scripted the questions related to 
impact, which the field workers were required to ask during their interactions with the 
beneficiaries. The IA methodology and its associated software created a new domain of 
knowledge that became constitutive of what legitimate impact is (and by implication, how it 
should be governed)—as Miller (2004, p. 181) observes, “what is counted usually counts.”   
Discussions between Leonard and Chandan revolved around the fields in the spreadsheet, the 
impact data and how to make it more rigorous.  During these discussions, Leonard would 
sometimes question the NGO’s work and intervene directly by asking for new fields in the 
spreadsheet, or voicing the priorities for how and why technology and software was required:  
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“The first thing is just to test … test how the technology can help. We want to … 
y’know so that it gives valuable information faster, to add value and so we can 
understand what’s really happening. … Obviously the technology is a tool for 
capturing … better … and faster … and analysing the data--that is the key.”  
What is ‘really happening’ is now what is represented in the spreadsheet, through its fields and 
associated calculative practices. The knowledge constituted through these calculative practices 
made governing operable, and constituted the relations between donor and NGO staff.  The 
donor in London was able to make judgements about impacts that its funding was actually having 
on beneficiaries.  The NGO staff and the volunteers were required to account for their 
development activities through the numbers they entered into the spreadsheet.  The importance 
of the data was also made visible by the attention it was given by the donor. As such, the NGO 
set up training programmes that explained the importance of impact data, and the questions that 
they had to ask the beneficiaries, and how to use the tablet.  Rose and Miller (1992, p. 183) 
suggest, “[w]e need to study [these] humble and mundane mechanisms by which authorities see 
to instantiate government…” Thus, what we see is that through these routine practices of 
training and data collection, the IA methodology becomes positioned as a powerful technology of 
government, in spite of its seemingly mundane character.  
The legitimacy of the donor’s knowledge claim to expertise, deriving from their experience of 
evaluating impact in their for-profit businesses, was taken as self-evident. It was seen as entirely 
legitimate that the donor should define the IA methodology and the associated systems for 
capturing data. The donors acted as the assessor of impact, while the NGO was primarily the 
collector of data.  What we see is that all the actors become implicated in the technology of 
governance. As they invest more of themselves in it, as calculating subjects, they also have an 
interest in maintaining its legitimacy. Even when impact data was uncertain and sometimes 
inaccurate, it was still collected. As Chandan explained in a number of ways: 
“We know the family size, landholdings but not exact figures for savings and 
expenditure … because they are not very exact, they don’t record their expenditure as 
they sell their produce, they get the money and they finish the money in a day. They 
don’t know how they have spent it.” 
 “… population density is high and there are a lot of disturbances, so when I am asking 
you a question there will be a few others, their neighbours all clamouring there, 
answering questions and disturbing and all that.” 
Such anomalies did not render the governing technology, and the regime of truth it enacted, as 
perhaps inappropriate. Rather, such challenges are treated as practical problems that need 
resolving such as, refining the spreadsheet, and providing better training for those collecting 
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impact data.   
Self-governing subjects and qualitative impact data 
Above it was suggested, that the calculative practices enacted a particular regime of knowledge 
or truth that defined what counted as development, and what did not—a regime that assumed a 
neo-liberal logic as self-evident. Alternative domains of knowledge existed.  The staff of the NGO, 
volunteers, and farmers had a situated, tacit understanding of what was happening ‘on the 
ground’, as it were, and which could potentially have challenged the dominant regime of truth. 
This knowledge could have been narrated by the actors as valid stories of how lives were 
impacted, or changed, because of the development activities of the NGO.  Such qualitative 
accounts might have offered the actors involved an opportunity to make some of their 
knowledge and expertise visible in order to create a counter discourse of legitimation.  As such, 
the researchers asked the NGO staff whether they collected more qualitative accounts of the 
impacts of their development activities. They suggested that they indeed had a whole database 
full of case stories of how their development work was affecting the community.  As an example, 
they offered the story or vignette of Devi, a farmer in Rajasthan, describing her participation in a 
project (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Farmer vignette from NGO report 
This excerpt of the story is very revealing, but not for obvious reasons. What is interesting about 
the vignette is its correlation with the data in the impact spreadsheet. It seems that these stories 
were constructed by narrating the numbers in the spreadsheet. In other words, they were 
constructed to create a consistency between the quantitative impact data and the qualitative 
stories. Why would they do that, and risk delegitimising their own situated knowledge?  One 
reading of this would be that they have become self-governing subjects. By that we mean that 
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they have accepted fully the validity of the governing technology, with its associated regime of 
truth. They felt it necessary to narrate the qualitative stories in terms of the quantitative data, in 
order to legitimate these accounts.   
Beyond these stories, there was a belief that more ‘qualitative’ data was necessary. As such 
qualitative interviews were conducted, in situ, using a fixed interview protocol as shown in Figure 
4.  Again, what we see is a set of questions that have Boolean or multiple-choice answers, which 
are more amenable to calculative practices (of counting and ordering). This design of the 
protocol is partly informed by the fact that the field workers had limited skills (and time) to 
capture more unstructured qualitative data. Nevertheless, it was also significantly shaped by 
what is seen as legitimate data in the regime of governance.  This is despite the fact that Leonard 
repeatedly expressed the need for beneficiaries to have more opportunities to narrate their own 
stories. For example, he suggested they do not just want to know that a farmer sells his goods in 
the market; other data would also be helpful:  
“ … if you sell in the market, then what is the process? How do you sell? Do you, do 
you yourself go there? I want him or her to kind of, say more on this.” 
What Leonard did not appreciate is the manner in which the governing technology had become 
internalised by the subjects it was supposed to govern. While he could imagine different data, 
which could tell a different story, for the NGO staff, as calculative subjects, IA became the way 
they legitimated themselves, their work, and their requests for resources. For them, as 
calculative subjects, they had to count, and to make what is counted count.   
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Figure 4: Qualitative interview protocol 
Becoming knowledgeable in the enactment of impact  
Becoming self-governing subjects means that power has now become internalised as a particular 
way one should be, legitimated by a regime of knowledge that constrains, but also enables. 
Within such a domain of knowledge, one can become an expert.  Such expertise can be used in 
pursuit of what is assumed to be one’s own objectives or interests.  As such, the NGO started to 
become more skilful in using the assessment practices and results to impress the donor in an 
attempt to secure further funding.  When asked to implement the IA method, the NGO identified 
an area close to Delhi that they knew was going to highlight their positive impact, given the 
governing technology.  Indeed, they referred to this as a ‘model district.’ It was a ‘model’, not in 
general terms, but in terms of that which was counted in the spreadsheet. They knew that it 
would look good through the calculative practices of the impact model.  Chandan, described how 
the overriding purpose of the assessment operation was akin to a sales pitch, and thus informed 
both research and later lobbying activities. 
“… we need to present it to prospective funders, fundraising events etc… we have 
moved the community from point x to point y… we chose those villages that could 
demonstrate greatest impact in terms of low starting point... So we want to say, hey 
guys, with the x amount of money that you have put in we have been able to leverage 
100 x  …So this is a kind of pitch that we are trying to do on the basis of solid evidence 
on the ground.” 
‘Solid evidence on the ground’ is now what is seen as that which counts, according to the impact 
model.  As the quote above highlights, representing their success, not just to the donor, but to 
other prospective donors was important.  NGO’s are often funded simultaneously by several 
donors, and further, as funding is fixed term, are also aware that they will need to continue to 
attract alternative donors.  Chandan explained how by using a “model district” as a sampling 
strategy, evidence could be marshalled to support fundraising negotiations. 
“we have taken the district as a model district. We want to show case this… that the 
work has changed the district vis-a-vis the other neighbouring districts. So we want to 
bring that … every factor in development.”  
Indeed, their selection of such a test bed for IA illustrates the NGO were clearly aware of the 
“before and after” project evaluation that they were subjected to. Their experience and expertise 
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in constructing such evidence was a vital part of not only satisfying their current donor (so as to 
maintain their work with farmers), but also to construct their sales pitch to future donors.  
Becoming a governed subject was also empowering. It allowed the NGO to enact themselves as 
‘successful’ and competent developers. However, this is in the terms of the governing technology 
and its governing rational—that is, neoliberalism. In internalising and enacting this governing 
technology they are becoming particular type of developers and development is becoming a 
particular type of activity. It is not clear that the actors understand this performativity? What 
seems to be a mundane practice of IA is transforming development practice—and it seems that 
all actors are caught up in it in more or less significant ways.  
6. REGIMES OF GOVERNANCE AND REGIMES OF INEQUALITY 
In this section, we will argue that inequality—understood as the circulation of asymmetries of 
power—in the international development sector can be understood, first through the enactment 
of a grant seeking marketplace, second, through knowledge/power inequality and subjectivity, 
and finally, in terms of its performativity (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Inequality in the international development sector 
The inequality of the market 
Competition will only work, in this marketplace for grant money, if inequalities can be 
established and constantly cultivated and maintained. It is assumed that without competition, 
there would merely be exchange between equals, without the discriminating and efficient force 
of the market. Inequality between actors—enacted as IA—then is the fundamental basis for 
enacting and governing the grant seeking market.  For inequality to circulate, IA must become 
adopted as a sort of currency. For something to function as a currency, equivalence is required. 
One unit must be like the other. Calculative practices achieve this equivalence through 
disembedding entities in the world and enacting them as a quantity (Callon & Muniesa, 2005; 
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Hansen & Mühlen-Schulte, 2012).  A currency also requires the enactment of value. IA enacts 
value by demonstrating an effect (or a change), which they claim can be attributed1 to the 
development activities of the NGO.  Equivalence and value allows for exchange and as a 
currency, IA is amenable to conscious political calculation.  
The circulation of IA as a currency, is intimately connected to the assumed neutrality of the 
impact data (Miller, 2008). As such, the circulation of inequality becomes seen as legitimate—
both necessary and fair.  It provided for the comparison of the NGO’s impact over time and also 
the comparison with other NGOs.  It meant that any NGOs wanting to compete for grants must 
adopt it, if they are to claim legitimacy.  Accordingly, IA, as a governing technology, has become 
enacted as fundamental to sector wide competition (The Global Fund, 2011). 
In the for-profit sector, markets tend to operate competitively when there is a certain symmetry 
between supply and demand.  In the international development sector, the grant seeking 
marketplace is very much one akin to an oligopoly, where there are limited demand (donors) and 
many suppliers of development activities (NGOs). Donors account for about 85%-90% of NGO 
funding (Banks & Hulme, 2012).  This dissymmetry means that donors can shape the circulation 
of inequality to a more or less significant degree. It also means that the currency (IA) becomes 
disproportionately significant for the NGOs—sometimes at the expense of development activities 
itself. This oligopoly was evident in our case. There were many alternative NGOs that could 
undertake rural development projects and as such the NGO was aware that the donor could 
potentially switch their funding to another NGO and/or switch their funding priorities away from 
rural farming communities. For Rural India, they must demonstrate they are better at doing 
development than other NGOs and were thus subject to attending to Imagines’ requests and 
requirements. Significant time and resources were invested in demonstrating impact 
(methodology, training, capturing data, etc.) and ‘keeping the donor happy’.   
Cumulatively, the establishment of a grant seeking market that can be characterised as an 
oligopoly, predicated on the currency of impact data, reconfigures relations across the 
international development sector.  This market conceives of the donor as the commissioner (the 
buyer) of development work and the NGO as the supplier, the implementer of the donor’s 
priorities.  Just as with any fixed term contract, donor funding will be renewed subject to 
satisfactory performance-judged against the impact metrics (Banks & Hulme, 2012).  This 
                                                     
1
 Much of the activity associated with the development of impact assessments is concerned with what is referred to 
as the ‘attribution gap’. In other words to demonstrated that there is a direct causal relationship between the 
activities of the NGO and the development effects achieved. This concern can be seen as a concern with the value 
claims of the currency (Chambers, 2010)  
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unequal structuring of relations between donors and NGOs then is a central outcome of the 
neoliberal regime of governance. 
Power/knowledge 
The market-oriented neo-liberal regime of governance privileges managerial knowledge 
produced by institutions that operate in competitive markets.  As such, the knowledge produced 
by the IA methodology enacted a particular neo-liberal understanding of what successful 
development was. This knowledge tended to delegitimise the local situated knowledge of the 
development practitioners within the NGO (Contu & Girei, 2013). More specifically, this form of 
knowledge connected directly to the aspirations of those who governed, allowing them to shape 
the discourse in more or less significant ways—making it operational and available to political 
calculation (Rose and Miller, 1992).   
As privileged knowledge, it becomes internalised and adopted—often implicitly—by the 
different actors, in pursuit of their own ends.  In our case, we saw this internalisation in the way 
the development practitioners approached qualitative IA by narrating numbers, as if it was a 
number in a spreadsheet.  Thus, regimes of governance and calculative practices enact and 
cultivate self-regulating subjects that internalise the knowledge, and in so doing, the governing 
logic of the equal inequality of the market (Rankin, 2001)—and they do this freely.  This market-
oriented subjectivity more or less displaces or delegitimises some of the original practices, values 
and meanings of NGOs (Banks & Hulme, 2012). This is akin to what (Roberts et al., 2005) refer to 
as subtle paternalism, where northern management knowledge transforms the day to day 
practices of NGOs in the global south.  
The privileged status of this knowledge also renders certain development work invisible and gives 
prominence to others. This is especially significant when we consider the fact that not all actors 
are positioned equally in terms of defining the actual calculative practices—as was evident in our 
case. The donor was able to define the relevant fields in the spreadsheet, train the NGO staff in 
the methodology, and use technology to ensure compliance with the methodology.  This 
dissymmetry was only possible because the governing logic was already accepted as self-evident 
by all the actors involved, freely.  
As knowledge circulates, it often circulates through, or becomes ‘tied’ to, specific positions—
which may over time become obligatory passage points.  For example, donors and international 
NGOs have Departments of Impact and Evaluation and staff with roles such as Directors of 
Impact. In addition, they often pay for consultants who specialise in IA to offer advice, develop 
impact methodologies and assessments. Through these positions, and their assumed expert 
knowledge, the self-regulating subjectivity of all the actors involved are further cultivated and 
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reinforced (Roberts et al., 2005).  These experts become the loci where what counts as good 
impact are specified and refined.  In contrast, NGO managers are typically general managers, and 
as such do not have such specialist expertise. Nor do they have the same access to the education 
and training that those working for donors or international NGOs have. These impact experts 
become valuable resources but also key nodes through which knowledge circulates, unequally.   
The unequal circulation of knowledge also enacts a different development subject. One who 
understands the importance of this impact knowledge and starts to use it productively.  In our 
case, it was clear that the NGO became increasingly knowledgeable about the importance of IA 
as a currency to be exchanged for their benefit. They started to carefully consider what data was 
collected and when (e.g. the model village and which families they visited).  This attempt to 
maximise their currency was seen as entirely legitimate in a competitive market where inequality 
was seen as necessary for the currency to circulate.  They tended to view their actions not as 
examples of ‘gaming the system’, rather, as being competitive, which for them were a necessary 
condition to continue to serve themselves and their beneficiaries (Banks & Hulme, 2012). 
However, it could be argued that such strategizing locks up time and resources that could 
otherwise had been focussed on beneficiaries (Banks & Hulme, 2012; Strathern, 2003). 
It could also be argued that the competitive practices of NGOs to maximise currency is 
potentially at the expense of other NGOs who are not as proficient.  For example, while the 
increased knowledgeability was empowering for Rural India, as they were able to develop 
legitimate knowledge claims for current and future donors, it was to the disadvantage of other 
relevant NGOs seeking funding. Nonetheless, this inequality is a necessary condition of power, 
and how one is positioned relative to its circulation matters a great deal.   
In the grant-seeking market knowledge and expertise to demonstrate impact becomes 
positioned as the principle way to produce value. As such, we see a shift to increasingly complex 
impact models and frameworks, requiring increasing expertise to develop, and to evaluate them.  
Potentially this has a variety of unexpected outcomes. Resources are diverted to developing 
knowledge and expertise, rather than development activity, as such. Development activity shifts 
to those activities that can be made more amenable to the calculative practices. Projects become 
designed, from the start, to achieve high impact evaluation, rather than necessarily achieving 
improvements for the beneficiaries. Smaller NGOs that cannot develop such expertise become 
displaced by larger international NGOs that have the resources to enact IA, expertly. As Foucault 
(1980) suggested, knowledge and power is co-constitutive.  
The performativity of the governing technology 
We have illustrated in the previous section that rather than IA methodologies being objective or 
22 
 
neutral, they operate within a specific political economy where inequality is central to its 
operation—that of neo-liberalism.  What does this inequality do or enact?  First, within such a 
political economy, it becomes enacted as a particular governing technology that connects—
through a set of calculative practices—the aspirations of those who govern, with the detailed 
activities of those who are governed.  These calculative practices transform quality into 
quantity. As quantity it renders comparable what is incomparable, and connects or relates what 
might not be connected or related, through quantification and tabulation (in a spreadsheet).  
Moreover, it also enacts a reversal, from quantity to quality. NGOs that do well in IAs are taken 
as ‘good’ developers, deserving of funding and investment.   
Second, calculative practices function as an anti-politics machine Ferguson (1994, p. 256). They 
allow the regime of governance to engage in “extremely sensitive political operations…almost 
invisibly, under the cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object”—what 
Ferguson calls an ‘instrument-effect.2’  IA purports to provide objective data that is the basis for 
equal and fair decisions. However, as it circulates this apparently objective knowledge, of 
demonstrated impact (or not), de/legitimises certain type of activities, and renders in/visible 
certain activities—especially, potentially competing activities and knowledge. Of course, most 
actors involved in the circulation know and understand this. It necessarily enacts unequal 
relations between actors as it circulates. It is exactly this implicit politics that makes the numbers 
circulate, and matter, for each relation in the network, differently.   
Third, within this circuit of knowledge/power the enactment of particular subjects are possible. 
The donor is enacted as a knowledgeable and responsible manager of resources who is 
accountable, and can account for the ‘worthiness’ or ‘impact’ of his investments.  The NGO staff 
become enacted as more or less experts at achieving and demonstrating impact (e.g. learning 
which impact cases to select).  These practices can be dismissed as ‘game playing’ but only to a 
certain point.  What makes these calculative practices persist is the deep-seated belief, by all the 
actors involved, that on some level, these numbers actually reflect reality—maybe not entirely 
appropriately, and maybe somewhat selectively—yet they do. This is their political power, 
disguised in seemingly objective calculations.  As (Miller, 2001) suggests so succinctly: “what is 
counted usually counts.” 
7. INSTITUTIONALIZING INEQUALITY: SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS  
We want conclude by returning to the theme of the special issue—the relationships between 
inequality, institutions and organizational practices. As already stated, institutional theory has 
mostly examined inequality indirectly, and second, institutional work, where we most closely 
                                                     
2
 Miller (2004) makes the same argument, when discussing the development of management accounting. 
23 
 
align our research, has thus far neglected pick up on Foucault’s later work on governmentality, 
which, as we have tried to show, is very relevant.   
Returning to our research questions, Figure 6 illustrates: (1) the role of impact assessment in 
shaping institutional inequality, and, (2) how these asymmetrical relations are enacted in 
everyday practice. We demonstrated and argued that calculative practices (understood within 
the frame of governmentality) translates the social institution of the neoliberal international 
development market into mundane organizational practices, in order to produce new domains of 
knowledge/power, which position the actors across development institutions in ways that 
facilitate the enactment of their own inequality, continuously and freely. 
Our analysis has highlighted that the market as a social institution shapes the interests of actors 
working within donor and NGO institutions, and crucially how people came to be governed 
through and by their own interests—specifically through calculative practices.  In the institutional 
literature on inequality, Albiston (2009) and Martin (2004), but also many others, suggest that 
the social organisation of meaning—through taken for granted categories, concepts, discourses, 
etc.—enact social institutions that are fundamental in understanding the way inequality becomes 
institutionalised. For example, Martin (2004, p.1266) argues that understanding gender as a 
social institution reveals some of the ways ‘gender’ is used to construct practices, social relations, 
rules, and procedures, unequally.  In our case, the market functions as a social institution to 
organise institutional work practices within and between the NGO and the donor. The idea of the 
market as an institution is well established (especially in neoliberalism). Also, outside of 
neoliberalism there is a general acceptance of the market (or market forces) as a valid and 
legitimate way of organising society, even if it is not perfect (Callon, 1998; Sen, 1985).  What is 
important to note here, is that the market for grant funding imagines all actors as more or less 
free and equal to choose how they participate—at least in principle, if not in practice.  Differently 
stated: such a market imagines a state of "equal inequality" (Lazzarato, 2009) —that is, inequality 
is fundamental to competition, though all actors are equal in choosing how they participate.  All 
the same, even if the market as a social institution is generally accepted as valid it is not obvious 
how to translate it into everyday organisational practices across the specific NGO and donor 
institutions within a grant seeking market. 
 
Competition in the  
Grant seeking market 
(Donors ---- NGOs) 
 
 
Impact assessment (spreadsheet) 
produces new type of ‘objective’ 
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knowledge 
Circulation of new types of 
power/knowledge 
Delegitimisation of local knowledge 
Production of calculative experts  
Gaming strategies (by all actors)  
Displacement of actual  dev. work 
 
Figure 6: Institutionalizing Inequality: the role of calculative practices 
Our research has shown that calculative practices are fundamental to this translation (Callon et 
al., (2007). As (Keeves & Darmawan, 2015): 845) highlight “it is only when the numbers can be 
compared that markets are able to act as markets.”  What makes calculative practices such 
powerful translators is their assumed neutrality, their ability to render comparable 
heterogeneous entities, and, their calculability through a single figure (Miller, 2008).  In our case, 
we saw how the IA functioned as a powerful technology to translate the strategic intentions of 
the donor, and indirectly, the social institution of the market into the daily lives of the NGO staff, 
the beneficiaries, etc.  Its calculability enacted through a humble spreadsheet, converted 
development effort into percentages that can be compared, plotted, reported, and discussed. 
Donors themselves are also caught up in this, as they are accountable for their impact to their 
board of directors or in the case of government donors, the public.  As a technology of power it 
does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon the actions of others; and 
in so doing presupposes the freedom for them to choose to act in one way or another.  Based on 
the percentages in the spreadsheet they can focus on this or that development activity or area—
they are free to choose as long as they can demonstrate impact in the terms of the 
knowledge/power enacted through the calculative practice.  This observation is in line with 
Lounsbury and Crumley’s (2007) call for institutional theory to guard against attending only to 
actors and not considering how cultural elements such as conventions and categories become 
embedded in wider meaning systems to shape organisational practices in significant ways. 
Impact assessment, as has been established in the rankings literature, shape actors behaviours 
and understanding of what is valued (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Espeland & Stevens, 2008) .  
Through these calculative practices, a ‘market logic’ becomes imbedded in mundane 
organisational practices. Certain categories, conventions, and practices become seen as more 
legitimate than others—in terms of the knowledge produced, in and through the calculative 
practices.  For example, resources are allocated in order to improve positions in the table, 
practices that achieve such improvements become more legitimate than others, and so forth. 
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This is, however, only part of the institutionalisation process. In order to capture a fuller picture 
we also need to attend to the mundane organisational practices, not only in terms of what they 
are, but also in terms of what they do—that is in terms of their performativity. 
Institutional inequality can be further understood with reference to regimes of inequality.  
Governmentality tells us that these calculative practices produce new types of knowledge; 
knowledge that can be used to make judgements and position activities and subjects in particular 
ways—especially unequally.  It becomes difficult to question the legitimacy of this new 
knowledge, especially in the terms of the knowledge that has being delegitimised.  For the NGO 
local knowledge about actual development was not expressible through the calculative practices.  
Expertise becomes defined in terms of this new knowledge, and so forth. What we see is the 
emergence of regimes of inequality, enacted through these new domains of knowledge. Impact 
assessment systems are good examples of this.  Nonetheless, what makes them especially 
powerful is that they are freely enacted by the very persons they position unequally. In addition, 
they are very difficult to counteract because they are assumed to be neutral, and already 
embody a social institution assumed legitimate – the grant seeking market.  
Of course, there are multiple opportunities for asymmetries within and between institutions 
located within the social institution of their market (e.g. within and between donors and NGOs).  
Actors are not necessarily positioned equally in the circulation of knowledge/power.  Thus, what 
we tend to find is the development of what Acker (2006, p. 443) calls regimes of inequality, 
which she defines as: “loosely interrelated practices, processes, actions, and meanings that result 
in and maintain class, gender, and racial [and other] inequalities within particular organizations.”  
We would want to be more specific and suggest that regimes of inequality are loosely 
interrelated practices, processes, actions, and meanings that result in the ongoing circulation of 
inequality, with significant consequences for those enmeshed in it.  In our case this was evident in 
how the regimes of inequality saw the knowledge claims of the donor become dominant in the 
relations with the NGO, but also in how the NGO was seeking to reorganise so as to become 
more knowledgeable in aligning itself with the interests of the grant seeking marketplace.  It also 
led to the NGO engaging productively with other potential donors though at the expense of other 
NGOs who were thus far unable to align their interests with those of the grant seeking market.  
Consequently, institutional inequality can be seen as an ongoing process of imbrication between 
regimes of inequality within and between institutions operating within a market.  As regimes of 
inequality emerge, various actors attempt to place themselves in positions where they can 
maximise their interests. As these regimes of governance become more pervasive, and accepted 
‘as the way the world is,’ these regimes of inequality may indeed become systemically 
embedded. These systemic circuits of inequality is the danger that we must attempt to make 
visible.  Especially, since they are enacted through assumed neutral knowledge and legitimate 
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institutions, and enacted freely by those caught up in these circuits of inequality.   
What we see is the emergence of a regime of governance (a particular regime of truth) in which 
all the actors have become caught up in, and which becomes internalised by all involved as the 
legitimate (or only) way to act, properly and responsibly.  This raises a number of implications for 
institutional inequality within and between international development institutions.  First, that 
the overriding governmentality of the grant seeking market is likely to lead to the acceleration of 
more and more complex apparatus for identifying and analysing impact (Ciborra, 2006).  This will 
extenuate some of the inequalities identified in this paper.  As in Dar’s (2014) case where the 
proficiency in English led to the recruitment of elite local staff, so too will the increasing 
complexity in impact reporting require that staff are expert in impact capture and reporting. As 
has been highlighted in other sectors, we see development workers being transformed into neo-
liberal ‘careering’ subjects often with their own career development in mind (Clarke & Knights, 
2015; Shore, 2008).  While this may professionalise the sector, it simultaneously leads to the 
marginalisation of many development workers, especially those who lack the necessary 
education to participate.  Second, there is a real danger that development will become 
understood as game playing.  Game playing implies that development workers do not have faith 
in the effectiveness of the grant seeking market, but instead on securing funding and their 
careers (Shore, 2008:292).  Further, game playing marginalizes direct and productive work with 
beneficiaries (Strathern, 2000).  Third, localised qualitative knowledge will be further 
marginalised as it can be easily discredited in favour of quantifiable impacts.  There is a real 
danger that impact assessment will subjugate and conceal much local development practice (Dar, 
2008). Fourth, the increasing complexity and knowledgeability pertaining to impact assessment is 
likely to favour international donors and NGOs who have access to resources and expertise to 
develop and demonstrate impact positively. Fifth, what we see is the ongoing dominance of 
northern management knowledge that is sustained through the social institution of the grant 
seeking market. 
To conclude, we acknowledge that our analysis and results are very much provisional, and 
situated in the Indian context, with a specific NGO / philanthropic donor interaction, and that 
research could also usefully consider the ways in which similar relations may hold more 
generally. This will include in-depth empirical research with a wide range of actors such as 
different types and sizes of donors and NGOs.  More generally, we suggest that our framework of 
institutionalising inequality—as presented in Figure 6, may also inform accounts of institutional 
inequality in other sectors such as health and education.  Central to such studies would be the 
way calculative practices produces knowledge that functions to de/legitimate certain practices 
and subject positions, which enact specific regimes of inequality, freely.  While the regimes of 
inequality—enacted through calculative practices—will work themselves out differently, we 
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suggest that there may well be many parallels.  In relation to institutional theory specifically, our 
focus on mundane organisational practices is something that Lawrence & Suddaby (2006) called 
for, especially in order to open up the specific details of how institutional control occurs (T. B. 
Lawrence, 2008), or in our case, how social institutions become translated into mundane 
organisational practices to produce regimes of institutional inequality.  We would suggest that 
attending to governmental practices—such as calculative practices—is a very effective way of 
revealing institutionalisation processes because they function as invisible forms of power that 
people exercise over themselves, freely.  Furthermore, we argue that governmentality allows us 
to understand how regimes of inequality continue to emerge and circulate in spite of their 
obvious danger. Clearly more work is needed. However, we would suggest our work indicates the 
potential for such endeavours.  
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